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C. Mantzavinos
The Ethical Project. A Dialogue
Abstract: In this dialogue the position of Pragmatic Naturalism as defended in Philip
Kitcher's The Ethical Project is presented and criticized. The approach is developed
dialectically by the two interlocutors and a series of critical points are debated. The
dialogical form is intended to honor the main objective in The Ethical Project : to
establish an ongoing conversation on ways to improve moral conceptions and processes,
which grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life.
STUDENT: Should we walk along the Hengsteysee?
KITCHER: Of course, this is a very good idea.
STUDENT: I am so glad that you have made it here to Herdecke, so that we
can talk about your Ethical Project. It has been a good chance for a visit now
that you are spending this year in Berlin.
KITCHER: Yes, indeed. I am really glad to be here. Let's walk then.
STUDENT: So, I understand that your ideas about ethics have now consider-
ably matured. But your main message that the ethical project is something that
has already started from our remote ancestors and is an ongoing enterprise still
remains?
KITCHER: Exactly. My thesis is that tens of thousands of years ago, our re-
mote ancestors began the ethical project. They introduced socially embedded
normative guidance in response to tensions and difficulties of life together in
small groups. They were equipped with dispositions to psychological altruism
that enabled them to live together, but the limits of those dispositions prevented
them from living together smoothly and easily. Out of their normative ventures
have emerged some precepts we are not likely ever to abandon, so long, at least,
as we make ethical progress. Besides those core themes, we have also inherited
a conception of the good that includes conflicting elements and that provides us
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with a far richer conception of human life than any the first ethical pioneers
could have apprehended. Our ethical task is to decide how to go on.
STUDENT: Posing the issue as an ethical project means that you view it as
fundamentally historical.
KITCHER: Exactly.
STUDENT: Why is this so important for you?
KITCHER: History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronol-
ogy, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which
we are now possessed. This is the opening phrase in Kuhn's The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Much earlier, more than a century ago, Darwin outlined
a novel way of thinking about the living world: his fundamental insight was to
regard the organisms around us as products of history. We can liberate our-
selves from mysteries about many of our current practices by emulating Darwin:
think of them, too, as historical products. My main aim is, thus, to pursue this
program in the case of ethics. Ethics emerges as a human phenomenon, per-
manently unfinished. We, collectively, made it up, and have developed, refined,
and distorted it, generation by generation. Ethics should be understood as a
projectthe ethical projectin which we have been engaged for most of our
history as a species.
STUDENT: I agree with that and I want to particularly welcome this point of
view on ethics. It is particularly refreshing given the nature and quality of most
contemporary discussions.
KITCHER: What do you mean? Which ones do you have in mind?
STUDENT: I mean all those discussions, particularly in the analytic tradition,
framed in terms of desires, which seem to me to be entirely disconnected with
human life.
KITCHER: Yes, my focus on ethical practice and its history attempts to honor
John Dewey's call for philosophy to be reconnected with human life. In this
sense I too dislike the kinds of discussions prevalent in the analytical tradition,
which seem to hardly matter in everyday life. But I also dislike, if I may say
so, ethical accounts, like that of Kant, which locate the moral law within us,
identifying it with Reason and that end up defending quite nebulous processes
supposedly legitimized by the aura of the apriori. And, of course, ethical codes
inscribed on holy tables cannot be acceptable either.
STUDENT: So, no authorities in ethics then?
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KITCHER: No authorities in ethics.
STUDENT: This is similar to the position of critical rationalism with respect to
ethics.
KITCHER: Do you mean the position of Karl Popper?
STUDENT: Not really. I rather had Hans Albert in mind, the German philoso-
pher whose work is highly original, arguing vigorously against authority in ethics;
and it seems similar to your own.
KITCHER: Tell me more about this.
STUDENT: Albert has criticized all attempts to construct an ethical system
more geometrico, and successfully so, as far as I can tell. For him dogmatization
is a possibility of human and social practice taken as a whole. It is an expression
of the fact that the will to achieve certitude triumphs over the will to attain
solutions that remain open to possible criticismsolutions subject to resistance
both from reality and from other members of society, which must either prove
their worth or come to grief in the process. He has pleaded for applying the crit-
icist approach to the problems of moral philosophy. This application involves, of
course, rejecting fundamentalismnot ethical pluralism, however. When we are
concerned about treating ethical statements and systems not as dogmas but as
hypotheses, then it is crucial to be able to consider alternatives and to generate
new perspectives yielding other solutions to ethical problems than those hitherto
current. Competing proposals should be subjected to a critical evaluation with
reference to the problems of our present situation. A critical moral philosophy
cannot be expected to provide the morality prevailing at any given time with
spurious justifications in order to anchor it more firmly in the consciousness of
people and in social conditions. Its task consists rather in shedding critical light
upon it, throwing its weaknesses into relief and developing viewpoints through
which it might be improved.
KITCHER: I think that I agree with that. The critical attitude is certainly
constitutive of all philosophy, but probably this is not enough.
STUDENT: What do you mean?
KITCHER: I mean that I certainly agree that this general critical attitude might
be able to protect us from a series of appeals to authority. Appeals to divine
will, to a realm of values, to faculties of ethical perception and `pure practical
reason' have to go. But then, we should put something in their place.
STUDENT: And what should we put in their place?
24 C. Mantzavinos
KITCHER: Pragmatic Naturalism.
STUDENT: Which is what?
KITCHER: It is the position that envisages the ethical project as begun by our
remote ancestors, in response to the difficulties of their social life. The natural-
ism consists in refusing to introduce mysterious entities`spooks'to explain
the origin, evolution, and progress of ethical practice. Naturalists intend that
no more things be dreamt of in their philosophies than there are in heaven and
earth. The pragmatism consists in viewing ethics as growing out of the human
social situation and consequently primarily in paying attention to actual ethical
practice.
STUDENT: I can understand where the stress is. Quite different from Hans
Albert, who is a fallibilist stressing the possibility of error in moral reasoning
you seem to focus on actual ethical practices and somehow take criticism and
fallibilism as given.
KITCHER: The point is this: to declare that our ancestors invented ethics is to
deny that they discovered it or that it was revealed to them. Pragmatic natural-
ism rejects the idea of a special momentlong ago on Mount Sinai, perhaps
when people received authoritative information about how they should live, and
also abandons surrogate philosophical theories about external constraints discov-
ered by special faculties. Yet to declare that ethics is a human invention is not
to imply it was fashioned arbitrarily. The ethical project began in response to
central human desires and needs, arising from our special type of social existence.
STUDENT: What exactly do you mean by that?
KITCHER: Think of altruism: the long-standing puzzle of the evolution of bi-
ological altruism has been solved by the recognition of two mechanisms, kin-
selection and the disposition to reciprocate.
STUDENT: But you do want to differentiate between biological and psycholog-
ical altruism?
KITCHER: Certainly. Psychological altruism is the kernel from which ethical
practice grows, because it lies at the heart of the type of sociality our hominid
ancestors experienced.
STUDENT: So, how did this type of sociality emerge in the first place?
KITCHER: In a world with scarce resourcesof whatever kindcompetition
among vulnerable animals may require their participation in coalitions and al-
liances. So, imagine a population of solitary organisms (the largest units being
mothers with dependent young) in an environment in which each must obtain
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a certain number of resources in order to survive and reproduce. Suppose the
resources are scarce, the animals fight over these resources, and the stronger
typically win. A five-stage process could have led from the initial situationno
cooperation except for maternal care in early lifeto the kind of social structure
found in chimpanzees, bonobos, and hominids.
STUDENT: I am eager to learn about this five-stage process.
KITCHER: Start with the condition of asociality in which animals range alone
finding some resources without contest and competing directly for others. In a
second stage some animals arise that are disposed to act together in contest and
to share the resources obtained so that the first coalitions are formed. Because
of the success of the early coalitions, larger coalitions form, sharing the benefits
they earn in conteststhis is the stage of escalation. In the fourth stage commu-
nity stabilization takes place: coalition size is ultimately limited by the difficulty
of defending all the resources in a range, and the habitat becomes partitioned
into ranges defended by stable communities, within which the resources are di-
vided by the formation of subcoalitions. Finally, genuine cooperation emerges
in which members of the stable communities increase their fitness by engaging
in optional games and behaving cooperatively.
STUDENT: I can accept that. But then something more does distinguish hu-
man societies from our primitive relatives.
KITCHER: Yes, essentially language. Obviously quite a few changes have oc-
curred since then, the most important being the acquisition of language. The
cumbersome peacemaking of our original hominids is replaced by a new device,
one pre-empting rupture rather than reacting to it and in principle capable of
operating in a wide variety of contexts.
STUDENT: What kind of device?
KITCHER: I call it a `capacity for normative guidance'. That device is neces-
sary for what we think of as ethical practice.
STUDENT: But the major challenge for a naturalistic approach to ethics con-
sists in showing how the achievement of the `ethical point of view' might have
evolved from more primitive capacities, of course.
KITCHER: No. The acquisition of a capacity for normative guidance, which we
can best understand, I think, as an ability to follow orders does not mark the
transition to the `ethical point of view'. That is not because there is some further
move that does the trick, one that shows how a very special kind of normative
guidancea special way of internalizing the orders, sayconstitutes the `ethical
point of view', but because the entire conception of the `ethical point of view'
is a psychological myth devised by philosophers. There are many ways to be a
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psychological altruist and, equally, many ways to undergo normative guidance.
None of these latter modes is especially privileged as definitive of an `ethical
point of view'.
STUDENT: So, there are many `ethical points of view'.
KITCHER: Yes. Behind the disposition to follow orders must stand practices
of punishment. Conversely, when punishment is present in a group, it can make
possible the evolution of elaborate forms of cooperative behaviour. The emer-
gence of more sophisticated forms of punishment is probably intertwined with
the evolution of languageand both are probably entangled with the acquisition
of normative guidance.
STUDENT: This thesis is hardly novel, of course. In textbook sociology this is
the standard story of internalization of norms based on different forms of pun-
ishment, which capitalize and exploit human fears.
KITCHER: It is hardly important whether this is textbook sociology or not.
For the ethical project that concerns us here, even at its early stages, different
groups may have cultivated different emotions, founding their ethical practices
in distinctive ways. There may be several ways to build a conscience. However
it is formed, conscience is the internalization of the capacity for following orders.
STUDENT: So, if society plays upon the individual as on a pipe, it need not
always be the same tune.
KITCHER: Hamlet saw it correctly!
STUDENT: The ethical project can only begin, then, when normative guidance
is socially embedded. But this is hardly novel, and sorry to be insistent, but this
is good old sociological theory.
KITCHER: Please stop repeating this! Of course, this is good old sociological
theory, but pragmatic naturalism is different from many other ethical positions,
and if I may say so its distinctive character and persuasive power consists pre-
cisely in the fact that it is not encapsulated from scientific endeavours. Ethics
cannot ignore scientific resultsit is as simple as that. Neither sociology, nor
anthropology for that matter: anthropological studies of societies whose ways
of life are closest to those of our early human ancestors show, for example, that
equality, even a commitment to egalitarianism, prevailed at the beginning of the
ethical project.
STUDENT: Of course, I agree that one should take scientific evidence seriously.
But please, nice stories of our ancestors sitting around campfires articulating
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and agreeing on ethical codes is nothing but romanticism. I thought that these
naïve socialistic stories were no longer with us.
KITCHER: I don't know whether the picture of campfire is romantic or not, and
probably I could live without it. But in any case quite a few anthropological
studies do show that norms of equality prevail in food sharing.
STUDENT: Equality in food sharing and the like does reflect actual ethical prac-
tice; and in this sense it is of great importance for your pragmatic naturalism.
But from this you cannot infer that this has been the outcome of a deliberate
search for norms according to which the group should live that has taken place
in discussions around the campfire. This is not an argument; this is wild specu-
lation.
KITCHER: It does contain, of course, some speculative elements, but this is a
quite reasonable assumption to make. I suppose that the ethical project began
with the acquisition of full language, at the latest fifty thousand years ago, and
that human societies were small until, at the earliest, fifteen thousand years
ago. I conclude that the social egalitarianism observed in contemporary hunter-
gatherers, and the kinds of social discussions in which they engage, were central
to the project for at least the first thirty-five thousand years.
STUDENT: What kind of mechanism is supposed to be at work here? I am still
not convinced.
KITCHER: Small societies reasonably fear the interference and predations of
neighbours. Social cohesion is vital, and no adult can be marginalized in nor-
mative discussion. The hominid bands out of which early human societies grew
resulted from the partitioning of the physical environment through coalition
building. The stability of the partition depends on the approximate balance
among neighbouring groups; and, where the groups are small, the contribution
of every member is necessary. Discussions that involve all adults, that aim to
answer to the needs of all adults, and that blur distinctions of rank and ability
were crucialthose discussions would have issued in agreed-upon rules for life
together.
STUDENT: The mechanism that you describe and which is supposed to estab-
lish the claim that there have been discussions ending in agreed-upon rules is
not very convincing, I am afraid. That our human ancestors have been living in
small groups roughly until ten to fifteen thousand years ago is indeed a plausible
assumption, relatively well-supported by findings of cognitive archaeology and
other disciplines. And, of course there has been interference and predations of
neighbours, so that a competition among groups must have been the normal
prevailing condition. Friedrich Hayek was, according to my knowledge, the first
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to analyze the group selection mechanism in the general framework of his theory
of cultural evolution.
KITCHER: I did not know that.
STUDENT: Hayek conceptualizes the process of cultural evolution as a process
of collective learning where the growth of civilization is equated with the growth
of knowledge. Hayek, in explaining the evolution of culture, stresses, on the
one hand, the innovation of individuals experimenting with new rules, and, on
the other hand, the competition between old and new rules and the selection of
those that led to the success of those groups who practiced them.
KITCHER: So, it is essentially a mechanism of group selection which is suppos-
edly at work here.
STUDENT: Yes. And the growth of knowledge which comes out of this process
does not include only the conscious, explicit knowledge of individuals, the knowl-
edge which enables us to state that this or that is so and so. It includes also our
habits and skills, our emotional attitudes, our tools, and our institutions  all
adaptations to past experience which have grown up by selective elimination of
less suitable contact.
KITCHER: And I guess that ethical rules are part of this general cultural stock.
STUDENT: Exactly. And they have emerged in the evolutionary process of in-
novation, competition and selection. The successful combination of knowledge
and aptitude is not selected by common deliberation, by people seeking a so-
lution to their problems through a joint effort; it is the product of individuals
imitating those who have been more successful and from their being guided by
signs or symbols, such as expressions of moral or aesthetic esteem for their hav-
ing observed standards of conductin short, of their using the results of the
experiences of others.
KITCHER: So, according to this mechanism there is no need for any discussions
around the campfire.
STUDENT: Right. Individuals adopt ethical rules for the reasons that I have
outlined, probably also for the fear of punishment; and the set of ethical rules
prevails over time that leads the group in which it is prevailing to the greater
relative success.
KITCHER: And what is the criterion of success?
STUDENT: Population size or population growth.
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KITCHER: I can see some problems with this view, but this is not important
here. Important is merely that you understand that my claim is quite moderate.
I do not advertise my story as a `how actually explanation', but merely as a `how
possibly explanation'.
STUDENT: I guess that a `how actually explanation' aims to tell the truth about
a sequence of events, but what is the aim of a `how possibly explanation'?
KITCHER: A `how possibly explanation' aims only to tell a story, consistent
with evidence and with background constraints: its status is not impugned by
pointing out that there are other options.
STUDENT: So, these explanations are based on conjectural history.
KITCHER: Yes, and given the temporal remoteness of the events and the limi-
tations of our evidence, modesty is required.
STUDENT: Modesty is, of course, a virtue, but this is still not very convincing.
My own conjectural history is, for example, that the hominid group in which the
norm of equality has been invented (not discovered!) has been most successful
vis à vis the other hominid groups, because it has been consistently supported
by a group of invisible angelsI could not tell whether they were male or female,
but they were angels in any case.
KITCHER: This is not a serious challenge.
STUDENT: Be that as it may.
KITCHER: By five thousand years ago, human beings had assembled in societies
vastly larger than the groups in which the ethical project beganand we possess
written records about that. Egalitarianism gave way to complex hierarchies, and
in the cultural competition `experiments of living' took place ending up with a
vastly enriched notion of the good life. Desires to develop one's talents became
central, as did engaging in particular relationships. To be secure, to be healthy,
to eat and to copulate are no longer enough.
STUDENT: You seem to imply that there has been some kind of progress. Did
I understand that correctly? But this does contradict with a Darwinian notion
of local adaptations without an overall upward trend.
KITCHER: Yes, it does. At the end of the day, I do not believe that the evolu-
tion of ethics is a matter of mere change.
STUDENT: So, there is ethical progress.
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KITCHER: Yes.
STUDENT: What kind of ethical progress are Nazism and Stalinism supposed
to represent?
KITCHER: I want to oppose to the view that the history of ethics is just one
damn thing after another. The evolution of ethics is not a matter of mere change.
It is definitely not analogous to a Darwinian picture of the history of life, re-
vealing only local adaptations without any overall upward trend. But I should
make clear that to resist the mere-change view is not to defend the prevalence
of ethical advances. It is to suggest the possibility of progress.
STUDENT: This seems challenging.
KITCHER: Let' s have a closer look at what has actually taken place in the his-
tory of ethical practice. The historical figures who figure in ethical transitions,
the vast majority of them unidentifiable as individuals, do not start from some
situation in which they lack ethical convictions, follow a process of reasoning or
observe some facet of reality, and thereby arrive at a well-grounded belief in an
ethical judgment. Actual historical agents were born into societies and socialized
from early childhood. They acquired practices of expressing ethical evaluations,
an extensive repertoire of ethical concepts, and dispositions to accept a body of
ethical statements, most of which were never questioned. However, reformers
actual reformers not philosophers!take up the ethical project as framed in their
culture, making proposals on the basis of empirical information they find salient.
STUDENT: So, I guess the point that you want to make is that reformers of
ethical practice always start from somewherenothing happens really de novo.
KITCHER: Ethical innovation does happen. But the fundamental principle is
that we always start from here.
STUDENT: So, ethical progress is not really aimed at?
KITCHER: No. It probably is not aimed at, but rather fortunate occasions take
place in which blind stumbling turns out well.
STUDENT: Ethical progress is not the product of reflection according to the
principle of reason or of any other rational procedure.
KITCHER: Ethical progress is something like `sleepwalking'. The sleepwalkers
stumble along, often, indeed perhaps most of the time, lurching from error to
error, but occasionally lighting upon new ethical truths.
STUDENT: Ethical truths? Is there something like that?
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KITCHER: Yes.
STUDENT: `You must stop preaching to me.' Show me the referent of this.
KITCHER: You do not need to adopt the framework of truth as correspondence.
STUDENT: I do not need to, but it seems reasonable to do so, if we want to
have a sensible discussion.
KITCHER: I want to propose a rival approach to truth: instead of considering
the structure of truth, how the truth of statements arises (what makes truths
true), one may adopt a functional account, seeking to understand what we aim
at in various areas of inquiry.
STUDENT: What are we aiming at in the case of ethical practice?
KITCHER: We should approach ethical practice in the following fashion: we
should seek the functions that ethical prescriptions and other parts of ethical
codes are to serve.
STUDENT: From what you say, you seem to have an argument that somehow
connects function, truth and ethical progress.
KITCHER: Exactly. Here is the rough outline idea of the argument. Truth
is readily seen as prior to other notions used to explain the objectivity of our
practices, concepts like progress, justification, and knowledge. To make progress
is to accumulate truth; to be justified is to proceed in ways reliably generating
true beliefs; to know is to have a true belief generated by a reliable process. In
this way of relating the concepts, an adequate response to the mere-change view
has to start with ethical truth. I propose the opposite: ethical progress is prior
to ethical truth, and truth is what you get by making progressive steps. Truth
is attained in the limit of progressive transitions. Truth, as William James put
it, happens to an idea. Pragmatic naturalism retains a notion of ethical truth
for expository purposes, but it starts from the concept of ethical progress.
STUDENT: This is a quite strong thesis.
KITCHER: My claim is simply that it is better to approach ethical practice pri-
marily under the point of view of progress: thinking in terms of truth narrows
the focus. For truth applies to statements, so we are led to conceive of the deci-
sion as one about descriptive counterparts of rules of the alternative code. There
are other components of ethical codesconcepts, exemplars, habits, emotions,
modes of inducing complianceand improvements to our own practice could
occur in each of these respects. Thinking in terms of progress responds more
directly to the practical choices we face.
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STUDENT: This seems strange to me.
KITCHER: Why? Take a parallel case which I am sure you will find illuminating.
STUDENT: Which one?
KITCHER: The case of technology. Our world is full of instruments, machines,
and devices that improve on previous efforts. The chair in which I sit, the light
illuminating my desk, and the computer on which I type are all refinements of
similar things I used some decades ago, and spectacular advances on things my
ancestors employed to similar ends. Progress with respect to these artefacts,
and in the domain of technology generally is readily understood as functional
refinement.
STUDENT: I agree with that.
KITCHER: It is exactly the same thing in ethics. Socially embedded norma-
tive guidance is a social technology responding to the problem background con-
fronting our first full human ancestors. None of them had a clear understanding
of that problem backgroundcrucially, the problems arise not for a single in-
dividual, but for the social group. The problems are felt by all. Ethical codes
serve the function of solving the original difficulties, dimly understood by these
ancestors. Initially, they offer only partial amelioration. Ethical progress con-
sists in functional refinement, first aimed at solving the original problems more
thoroughly, more reliably, and with less costly effort. In the course of progress,
however, the problem background itself changes, generating new functions for
ethics to serve, and hence new modes of functional refinement.
STUDENT: So, the function of ethics is the remedying of altruism failures.
KITCHER: Exactly. Neither we nor our descendants are likely to achieve a com-
plete solution, one that will correspond to a complete and exact characterization
of the altruism failures to be remediedor, correspondingly to a complete sys-
tem of ethical principles. At its most progressive, the evolution of ethics is a
series of responses to the most powerful sources of residual social conflict.
STUDENT: So, how do ethical function, ethical progress and ethical truth tie
up in the end?
KITCHER: Descriptive counterparts of ethical rules count as true just in case
those rules would be adopted in ethical codes as the result of progressive transi-
tions and would be retained through an indefinite sequence of further progressive
transitions. There is no prior conception of ethical truth, so that people make
ethical progress when they discover or stumble on independently constituted
ethical truths. Progress is the prior notion, and descriptive counterparts of
rules come to count as true in virtue of the fact that they enter and remain in
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ethical codes that unfold in a progressive sequencetruth happens to an idea.
Derivatively, Tarskian machinery of correspondence truth allows the extensions
of ethical predicates as `wrong', `good', and so forth, to be fixed to make the
counterparts of rules accepted under indefinitely proceeding progressive transi-
tions true, but there are no prior independent properties to which those who
formulate and preserve the rules respond.
STUDENT: But given this understanding of ethical truth, can we make claims
about the truth or falsehood of ethical statements?
KITCHER: We are never at the end of the ethical project, never at some hypo-
thetical limit of any progressive sequence of ethical practices. Yet, we confidently
assert some, relatively imprecise and vague, ethical statements, declaring that
honesty is typically right and that murdering people who have done no harm is
typically wrong.
STUDENT: How can we be confident these statements will endure as our ethical
practices progress?
KITCHER: We cannot. There are quite a few issues involved, the most impor-
tant being that there are obviously areas in which the convergence of progressive
tradition is genuinely in doubt. We can imagine two different ethical traditions
proceeding indefinitely, making a series of progressive transitions, without its
ever being possible to integrate their differing accomplishments.
STUDENT: This sounds like an incommensurability problem à la Kuhn.
KITCHER: Yes, indeed. I think that there is sometimes a real incommensura-
bility of practices, hence also a possibility of pluralism. And I can live with the
consequences of that: where that possibility is realized there will be no determi-
nate ethical truth.
STUDENT: So, your position is that notions of truth and falsity do not always
apply in the ethical domain, for the core of ethical truth is surrounded by a
periphery of pluralism.
KITCHER: Exactly.
STUDENT: They only apply when there is commensurability of practices and
they can be compared.
KITCHER: Indeed.
STUDENT: I can see that your position is quite delicate and differentiated. But
the naturalistic fallacy can hardly be shown to be avoided. Hume is still with us.
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KITCHER: No, not at all. The Humean challenge can be tackled head-on. The
worry concerns the justification of the elements of ethical practice. I acknowl-
edge that naturalists must elaborate an account of the justified beginning and
growth of the ethical project, showing it to be free of the sorts of inferences Hume
questioned, the types of inferences appearing, for example, in social Darwinism
and human socio-biology.
STUDENT: Exactly.
KITCHER: Here is how the worry can be met: in my framework, ethical progress,
not ethical truth, is the fundamental notion. So, instead of posing the challenge
as a question about whether inferences from factual statements to normative
statements would be likely to yield correct conclusions from true premises, the
issue has to be reformulated. Is it possible to understand how our ancestors made
progressive transitions, and did so on the basis of processesobservations, emo-
tional responses, modes of reasoninglikely to promote progressive transitions?
An affirmative answer would remove the sting from the challenge. For it would
demonstrate how any inferences made accord with the fundamental criteria for
good inference, and thus are exempt from the mysteries Hume rightly queried.
STUDENT: I think that I now have got the big picture of the ethical project.
The appearance of having confronted Hume's problem successfully is founded
on the notion of function, which is crypto-normative. You present it such as if
it were entirely positive, but in the end it hijacks normativity into the game.
KITCHER: I do not see that.
STUDENT: If you do not want to admit this, then please allow me to point out
what is probably the main trick of your approach.
KITCHER: Now I learn that I am a jongleur. I thought that I am a philosopher!
STUDENT: Taking ethical progress as the fundamental notion, rather than eth-
ical truth seems to me to be exactly the same move that you have made in
your philosophy of science. The innovation there has been to propose to ground
causal claims in claims about explanatory dependence rather than vice versa.
Your main idea there is that our view of causal dependency in many cases stems
from an appreciation of the explanatory ordering of our beliefs. This accounts
for the intuition, for example, why we do not accept that the length of shad-
ows explains the heights of towers, but, by contrast, that shadow lengths are
causally dependent on tower heights. The move there was to make explanation
the fundamental notion, rather than causality, exactly as you suggest now to
make ethical progress the fundamental notion, rather than ethical truth.
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KITCHER: I think that you are right in your diagnosis! However, as you know,
I have in fact now abandoned the unification view of explanation.
STUDENT: I hope that you will not do the same with your ethical theory after
twenty years!
KITCHER: I always learn as I age!1
STUDENT: I like that you acknowledge the dynamic character of your own
knowledge development!
KITCHER: I do. And I also do in the case of ethics. I think that the static vi-
sion that guides almost all approaches to normative ethics is futile. It is not the
case that correct principles and precepts await discovery, and once apprehended
they can be graven in stone. The ethical project evolves indefinitely. Progress
is made not by something independent of us and our societies, but by fulfilling
the functions of ethics as they have so far emerged. The project is something
people work out with one another. There are no experts here.
STUDENT: I think I share with you the conviction that the ethical project has
a fundamentally dynamic character. But if this is so, then what is the role of
the philosopher in this project?
KITCHER: In his famous image, which I am sure you are familiar with, Otto
Neurath specified our epistemological predicament, comparing us to sailors who
must constantly rebuild the vessel on which they sail. Pragmatic naturalism
takes a similar approach to ethics, assigning philosophers the task of facilitating
discussion on how we should continue the project of living together. Philosophy
makes proposalsand this is itself a proposal.
STUDENT: What kind of proposals?
KITCHER: Basically two types. One type of proposal identifies the problems,
unsolved and partially solved, to which ethical practice has responded: call this
the diagnostic proposal. The other type of proposal, the methodological proposal,
should offer suggestions about how proposals are to be adjudicated, about the
rules of the continuing ethical conversation.
STUDENT: So, you propagate a specific method for ethics?
KITCHER: I do not propagate oneI propose one.
STUDENT: What is your proposal then?
1 Γηρα´σκω α´ει´ διδασκo´µενoςan ancient Greek proverb.
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KITCHER: The first ethicists focused on the altruism failures within small
groups, treating the members of those groups as equal with respect to the sim-
plest preconditions of the good life and seeking the cooperation of all with all.
Because the pertinent population has expanded dramaticallyto include all of
usand because the evolution of ethics has bequeathed to us a richer concep-
tion of the good life, the goal has been modified: equality with respect to basic
needs has given way to equality of opportunity for a worthwhile life. Now, I
propose that in our modern `group', which is numbered in billions, we should
scale up the circumstances of mutual engagementthe deliberations among band
membersfrom those that prevailed in the original venture. Public ethical de-
liberation can proceed by attempting to simulate a conversation of the pertinent
kind. Faced with functional conflict, so that revolutionary change is in order,
public contributors to ethical discussion are judged by their ability to ground
their proposals in mutual engagement: that is, to introduce the considerations
and lines of reasoning that would be brought forward to achieve consensus were
the entire human population to participate, under conditions of mutual engage-
ment, in a conversation about the regulation of conduct.
STUDENT: I think I have made clear before that the idea of discussions around
the campfire at the beginning of the ethical project are least convincing to me.
This is so mainly on evidential grounds and because the emergence, dissemina-
tion, and prevalence of ethical rules over the early millennia of the existence of
our species can be perfectly well explained without any assumption of conscious
deliberation about norms around the campfire. The idea of an ideal conversation
which would supposedly lead to a consensus about norms is even less acceptable.
As you know, this is hardly a new idea. Apel and Habermas have made a career
out of it in Germany.
KITCHER: I know that, but Habermas is not really clear and Apel, though
inspired by the pragmatists, defends other kinds of claims in his Transzenden-
talpragmatik.
STUDENT: Transzendentale Träumereien.
KITCHER: Independently of how other ethical approaches have made use of
the idea of an ideal conversation, I think that it is consistent to insist on public
ethical deliberation, modified to the modern conditions, given the continuity of
the ethical project and the successful use of this method throughout the devel-
opment of the ethical projectadmittedly under different conditions.
STUDENT: I see that you insist on public discussions, around campfires, an-
cient and modernand I think that I can understand your insistence since this
is an integral part of a normative ethics propagating the possibility of ethical
progress. So, if you do not want to accept this criticism of mine, let me ask
something else: don't you view it as inconsistent and highly problematic that,
on the one hand, you seem to suggest that those norms should be accepted that
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will be the outcome of an ideal public ethical deliberation, but, on the other
hand, you seem to want to make substantive proposals about ethical norms?
KITCHER: Yes, of course I want to make substantive proposals. One is that the
conception of the good may well demand that auent people sacrifice certain
luxuries, for doing so could ease the burdens of the poor. Another is that rather
than providing diet pills and cosmetic treatments, biomedical research ought to
be reoriented to tackle infectious diseases, in the environments in which they
kill and disable millions. Besides, pragmatic naturalism proposes that further
resources, including quality education and medical care, be distributed to all. I
have many further substantial suggestions; and I do not see why they should be
inconsistent with my methodological proposal?
STUDENT: Propagating an ideal conversation as the method of ethics, which
yields as an outcome the ethical norms that the group should respect clearly
makes pragmatic naturalism a procedural approach to normative ethics. In other
words, this is an approach which focuses on the process and christens as `good'
or `moral' whatever consensually comes out of this process. It evaluates the
rules that guide the process rather than the outcomes of the process. However,
this very same approach is propagating at the same time a series of substantial
proposals which are supposed to further `the good'. It thus evaluates existing
outcomes directly, designates them as `bad', and proposes instead other, `good'
outcomes. It is quite obvious that there is a fundamental inconsistency involved
here.
KITCHER: I do not see this. Pragmatic naturalism denies ethical expertise. The
role philosophy plays in ethics can only be of midwifery: to suggest a direction
for renewed conversation and some rules for mutual exchange. The egalitarian
conception of the good and the method for ethical decision that aims to simu-
late wide-ranging deliberation under conditions of mutual engagement are not
for any single person to answer. Philosophers can make proposals, attempting to
facilitate the conversation that would deliver answers. This work of facilitation,
I call philosophical midwifery.
STUDENT: I see. Philosophical midwifery is nothing else than the Socratic
maieutic method with an evolutionary and pragmatic touch. But, if this is the
case, then there is no authority at all conferred upon the proposals and so I
cannot understand why one ought to make fuss about ideal conversations and
the like. If you are willing to let the conferral of authority upon normative
proposals go, then everything that seemed interesting in pragmatic naturalism
evaporates. And, of course, you cannot claim that there is anything like ethical
progresssince this diagnosis also presupposes the force of some kind of norma-
tive authority.
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KITCHER: You do not seem to appreciate my modesty.
STUDENT: Of course I do, but it seems to me that this is not an honest modesty
in the end, if I may say so. Someone who defends a massive redistribution of the
scarce resources of a society towards the fulfilment of what he regards as the ap-
propriate conception of the good, prompted by promoting ethical progress is not
really modest. Taking also into consideration that these supposedly progressive
steps, if sustained, would even lead to something like ethical truths makes the
whole approach even less modest, I think.
KITCHER: Even if I depose the philosopher-king from his throne, you still do
not want to acknowledge the modesty of my position?
STUDENT: Of course I do. However, this is not going far enough. Ethical plu-
ralism is also concomitant with a non-cognitivist approach to ethics which you
do not seem to consider seriously as an alternative: human beings, philosophers
and non-philosophers, just make decisions trying to solve the problems they en-
counter in their social environment in what seems to them an apt way to do
so, i.e. taking into account the specifics of the situation and the emotions and
needs of others. Their freedom of choice is not and must not be constrained by
moralizing philosophers. This seems to me to be a truly modest position.
KITCHER: For me this is not a modest position, but the castration of the en-
deavour to even start to work on the ethical project.
STUDENT: This needs more discussion, but I am afraid that we should be head-
ing back now.
KITCHER: Yes. Let us continue our conversation when I come to Athens next
summer.
